Volume 71

Issue 1

Article 6

December 1968

Constitutional Law--Torts--Equal Protection of Illegitimate
Children
David L. Core
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
David L. Core, Constitutional Law--Torts--Equal Protection of Illegitimate Children, 71 W. Va. L. Rev. (1968).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss1/6

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Core: Constitutional Law--Torts--Equal Protection of Illegitimate Child

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Torts-Equal Protection
of Illegitimate Children
An action was brought on behalf of minor illegitimate children
for the wrongful death of their mother. The trial court dismissed the
suit. On appeal the dismissal was affirmed on the grounds that the
denial of the cause of action bore substantial relation to the general
health, morals and welfare of people and discouraged bringing
children into the world out of wedlock; and, that the dismissal was
not a denial of equal protection of the laws, in that there was no
discrimination based on race, color or creed. The Supreme Court
of Louisiana denied certiorari and the case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The denial to
illegitimate children of the right to recover for the wrongful death of
their mother on whom they were dependent constitutes invidious discrimination against them in violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1509
(1968). In the companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee
and Liability Insurance Co., 88 S. Ct. 1515 (1968), the Supreme
Court applied its holding in Levy by reversing lower court decisions
denying a mother a cause of action for the wrongful death of her
minor illegitimate son.
The Louisiana wrongful death statute' specifies the surviving
spouse and child or children of the deceased as the primary class
of beneficiaries. The surviving father and mother, or either of them,
comprise the secondary class of beneficiaries. The courts of Louisiana have construed "child" or "children" as used in the wrongful
death statute to mean legitimate children. This interpretation is in
accord with that of most jurisdictions. The general rule was well
stated in a recent Pennsylvania case:
When the words 'child' or 'children' appear in a statute, in the
absence of qualifying expression, such words are to be interpreted ...

as referring to a child or children begotten in lawful

wedlock... or begotten out of wedlock but legitimatized ....
Civ. CoDE ANN. art. 2315 (1952).
Frazier v. Oil Chemical Co., 407 Pa. 78, 85, 179 A.2d 202, 206-07

I LA.
2

(1962).
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There have been exceptions to the general rule,3 and four states now
have statutes which provide specifically that an illegitimate child
may recover for the wrongful death of its mother.4 In addition,
illegitimate children have been constructed to be "children" within the
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act (unless to do so
would offend state policy),' under the Federal Death on the High
Seas Act,' and under the Jones Act.'
Despite the execeptions noted, in not only Louisiana, but in the vast
majority of the states, classes of proper plaintiffs and beneficiaries
under the wrongful death statutes have been determined in terms of
legal relationships. In the Levy and Glona cases, however, the
Supreme Court held that this basis of classification results in invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.8 The Court declared that such classifications must now be made not on the basis of legal relationships, but on
the basis of biological relationships.
The dissenting opinion in the Levy case contends that it is not
clear how the biological classification for determining proper parties
under wrongful death statutes is more rational than the legal relation
criterion. 9 The seeming insistence in the dissenting opinion that the
biological relation criterion must be rationally superior to be acceptable is questionable. It disregards the explanation in the majority
opinion that it is not the classification itself which is required to be
rational, but the line drawn by, or the purpose of, the classification
which must meet this test.'" The Court observed that there is a
lack of proper purpose in legislation which subjects an illegitimate
child to all the responsibilities of citizenship, yet permits a tortfeasor to go free simply because the person who suffers injuries at
his hands is illegitimate. The majority concluded that there is no
propriety in a statute which places under a disability one whose
action, conduct or demeanor bears no relation to the harm suffered.
3 Marshall v. Wabash R. Co., 120 Mo. 275, 25 S.W. 179 (1894); Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R. Co. v. Walker, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 106
S.W. 705 (1907); Annot., 72 A.L.R.2d 1235, 1237 (1960).
4 S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 10:4, at 589-90 (1966).
The states are Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi and South Carolina.
- Hammond v. Pennsylvania R., 31 N.J. 244, 156 A.2d 689 (1959).
6Civil v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 217 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1954).
7 In re Wenkhous' Estate, 158 Misc. 663, 286 N.Y.S. 518 (1936).
8
"No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
9 Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
10 Levy v. Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1509 (1968); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S.

457 (1957); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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The Court's reference to "dependency" in the Levy case presents
another plausible question. Was it the intent of the Court to make
"dependency" an element essential to the right to maintain a cause of
action? It would seem unlikely that this is so, because the question
of dependency could be no more logically or relevantly attached to
the biological relationship basis of classification announced in this
case than to the legal relationship basis rejected. It is also improbable
that the Court's intention was to complicate the process of recovery
granted by the cases by requiring a showing of "dependency". On
the contrary, the more likely reason for the mention of "dependency"
in the Levy case is to be found in the principle that the Court will
not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required
by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.""
The holdings in the instant cases, unless extended, are not applicable to West Virginia law. The West Virginia wrongful death
statute provides that a wrongful death action may be initiated only
by the personal representative of the deceased, 2 and that the amount
recovered shall be distributed in accordance with the laws of descent
and distribution.'" The descent and distribution statutes' 4 place
illegitimate children on the same footing as legitimate children with
respect to inheritance from and transmission of inheritance on the
part of the mother. In view of the fact that these statutes have not
been construed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
in an action for damages by an illegitimate child for the wrongful
death of its mother or the reverse situation, it can only be surmised
that the language of the statutes would be interpreted to allow a
cause of action, and thereby be in accord with the principal cases.
In any event, the Levy and Glona cases dictate that such a judicial
interpretation of the statutes be rendered if such a case is presented
for determination.
The decisions in Levy and Glona must on their facts be limited
to the mother-child relationship. However, an obvious possible extention of the holdings would be to permit a recovery in a fatherchild relationship in which the identity of the father has been
legally determined but the child had not been legitimatized. One
" Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885).
12 W. VA. CODE ch. 42, art. 1, § 6 (Michie 1966).
13Id.

14W. VA. CODE ch. 42, art. 1, § 5 (Michie 1966); Simpson v. State
Compensation Commissioner, 114 W. Va. 814, 816-17, 174 S.E. 329, 330
(1934).
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hypothetical situation in this context might serve to bring some of
the plausible problems into clearer focus.
Suppose that M delivered an illegitimate child, S, and that F was
legally determined to be the father of S as the result of a paternity
suit initiated by M. Assume further that F was later killed in an
automobile accident in which the fault of the second driver involved
in the accident had been clearly established. Would S be able to
recover for F's wrongful death, or conversely, had S been the accident
victim, would F be able to recover?
The hypothetical situation contemplates a case in which the
legal, and hence, the biological relationship of father-child has been
established, and an accident has resulted in the death of either father
or child in a fashion that would create a cause of action for wrongful
death but for the illegitimacy of the child.
West Virginia and two other states"5 have wrongful death
statutes which specify that the beneficiaries of a wrongful death
action are those named in the intestacy statutes. Connecticut has a
similar statute, which provides that the beneficiaries are those named
in the decedent's will, and in the absence of a will, recovery shall be
according to the intestacy laws.' 6 In all four of these states, intestate
succession between the mother and the illegitimate child is permitted; but of these four states, only Iowa permits intestate succession
between the father and the illegitimate child, even when paternity
has been legally established.'" The holdings in the instant cases are
that illegitimacy is not a valid basis for denying a cause of action for
wrongful death in the instance of a mother-child relationship. Therefore, the wrongful death statutes of West Virginia, Connecticut and
Wyoming when read together with the intestacy statutes would seem
to deny a recovery in the case of the father-child relationship hypothesized. This possible denial might well be found to promote the
invidious discrimination prohibited by these decisions. Indeed, any
statute which purports to deny a cause of action to an illegitimate
child or its father for wrongful death, where the relationship has been
established, would seem to be contrary to these decisions.
David L. Core
' 5 IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (1964); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1066 (1957); S.
SPEISER, supra note 4, § 10:1 at 584.
16 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 795,

§ 45-280 (1960); S. SPEISER, supra

note 4, § 10:1 at 584.
17

6 R. POwELL, REAL PROPERTY § 1003, at 660-61 (1958).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss1/6

4

